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Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy 
 
Summary 
Analyses of public goods regularly address the case of pure public goods. However, a 
large number of (international) public goods exhibit characteristics of different degrees 
of publicness, i.e. they are impure public goods. In our analysis of transfers helping to 
overcome the inefficient provision of such goods, we therefore apply the Lancastrian 
characteristics approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider the case of a 
continuum of impure public goods. We employ the example of international conditional 
transfers targeting to overcome suboptimal low climate protection efforts by influencing 
the abatement technology choice of countries.    
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1. Introduction 
The quality of human life is threatened by various environmental problems ranging 
from the relatively local (e.g. indoor pollution) up to the universally global (e.g. 
climate change). There are several different environmental protection options for 
combating such threats and these options – in turn – involve different kinds of public 
goods, which yield benefits on different geographical scales.  
Individual countries assign divergent relative priorities to the different environmental 
threats and hence to the benefits of environmental protection options. In this study we 
represent these divergent priorities in a modelling framework that allows us to 
understand the potential for international transfers for inducing world-wide optimal 
provision levels of both locally as well as globally public environmental goods.  
There are meanwhile plenty of research contributions addressing issues concerning 
global public goods and atmospheric externalities (see, e.g., Chakravorty, Roumasset 
and Tse (1997); Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2003); Sheshinski (2004)). Cornes and 
Itaya (2004) consider the case where more than one public good can be produced.
1 
They assume that the public goods are supplied by ‘summation technology’
2 and 
therefore consider the case of pure public goods. Yet, since most public goods (e.g., 
climate policy or biodiversity conservation) exhibit impure publicness, we consider 
them to be impure-public joint-production goods. Therefore, similar to Cornes’ and 
Itaya’s idea of the case of more than one pure public good, we develop an approach 
which allows for the presence of more than one impure public good. Since the pure 
                                                 
1 Cornes and Silva (2003) investigate the case of more than one local public good. 
2 Summation technology is used to define the case where the provision of a public good is the 
sum of the contributions of each of the providers of that good. This essentially defines the 
‘pure’ public good case.   3
public good case is one specific case in the more general impure public model, we 
implicitly include the pure public good case as well.    
Pioneering work concerning impure public goods has been provided by Cornes and 
Sandler (1984). They develop an approach to analyze this type of public good where 
the consumers’ utility function is defined over three characteristics.  Cornes and 
Sandler (1994) investigate the comparative static properties of this standard impure 
public good approach. These deviate significantly from those of the standard pure 
public good model. Recently, Kotchen (2007) provided an analysis of the impure 
public good model’s equilibrium properties. Cornes and Sandler (1984) suggest 
applying the impure public good approach to an activity like philanthropy. This idea 
was elaborated by Andreoni (1986, 1989, 1990) and initiated a new strand of literature 
that is largely associated with the expression “warm-glow giving”. Vicary (1997, 
2000) provides an analysis that considers different technologies available for raising 
the level of the regarded public characteristic. In his model, simple donations only buy 
the public characteristic while the purchase of an impure public good generates both, 
private and public characteristics. An example would be a choice between a simple 
donation to protect a rain forest and the purchase of products from a rainforest, where 
part of the payment was used to protect the forest. The buyer would then both 
consume the private good and provide some public good benefit. In contrast, Rübbelke 
(2003) takes into account alternative technologies to produce the private characteristic 
associated with the impure public good. An example here would be the choice 
between buying coffee that is grown in a way that conserves high biodiversity areas 
and buying coffee that is grown without taking such concerns into account. Finally 
Kotchen (2005, 2006) allows for both, an independent production of the private 
characteristic as well as of the public characteristic of the impure public good.     4
Based on the standard impure public good approach developed by Cornes and Sandler 
(1984), we will – as a first step – illustrate the case of two impure public goods in a 
two-country world and we will show that impure public goods are provided in an 
inefficient way in the absence of coordinated action between countries. 
Then – as a second step –, we will generalize the two-impure-public-goods model to 
the more general case of a continuum of impure public goods and analyze whether 
transfers may help to overcome inefficiencies in public good provision. Throughout, 
we employ the example of impure public policies or technologies combating 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and local/regional air pollution. However, our 
approach can be applied to all kinds of impure public goods, e.g. refuse collection, 
green-electricity programs, military defence activity or anti-terrorist activities.
3  
We proceed as follows: We explain the concept of impure public goods in Section 2 
and apply it to climate policy. In Section 3, we regard the special case where two 
alternative impure public technologies, which simultaneously protect the global as 
well as the local/regional environment, are available. The global effect or 
characteristic of the regarded environmental policies is climate protection. On the 
other hand the ancillary local/regional effects of these policies are characterized by the 
mitigation of local/regional air pollution. We demonstrate that the impure public goods 
are provided in an inefficient way as long as there is no coordination among countries. 
In Section 4, we describe and analyze the trade-off between local/regional and global 
impacts of environmental protection policies in a more general impure public good 
model which not only considers two different impure public technologies but a 
                                                 
3 Dubin and Navarro (1988) employ the impure public good approach to analyze refuse 
collection, Kotchen and Moore (2007) explore green-electricity programs, Sandler and 
Murdoch (1990) as well as Sandler and Hartley (2001) investigate military alliances and Pittel 
and Rübbelke (2006) analyze terrorist activities.   5
continuum of such technologies. We analyze whether international transfers could help 
to raise the suboptimal (low) provision of global environmental protection, taking 
account of local/regional co-benefits. In the framework of our model, the transfer-
paying industrialized countries induce a technology switch in transfer-receiving 
developing countries from technologies mainly protecting the local/regional 
environment (and to a lesser extent the global commons) to technologies mainly 
combating climate change (and to a lesser extent the local/regional environment). 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Impure Public Technologies and Climate Protection 
In developing countries the main focus of environmental policies is on the combat of 
local or regional threats. In many cases these local or regional policies also produce 
global benefits (Eskeland and Xie (1998)). As Gielen and Changhong (2001: 258) 
stress the order of issues on the political agenda in developing countries like China is: 
“First the apparent local air pollution problems are tackled; next the more distant GHG 
problem is considered. Therefore, it is more relevant to study the impact of local air 
pollution abatement on GHG emission reduction than vice versa.” In contrast, policies 
to protect the global commons are highly ranked in industrialized countries, while 
local and regional pollution problems are of less interest since the respective pollution 
levels are already quite low in these countries.
4 
Consequently, there is an asymmetry in the perception of environmental threats and 
the appreciation of environmental policies in the international arena. Industrialized 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless there are still significant benefits from local/regional air pollution mitigation in 
industrialized countries. Burtraw et al. (2003) investigate co-benefits of climate policies in the 
US and stress that ancillary benefits from reductions in NOX contribute significantly to 
justifying the cost of reducing carbon emissions.   6
countries have mainly an interest in raising the level of environmental policies, which 
mainly yield the protection of the global commons like the world’s climate.
5 In 
contrast, developing countries prefer policies whose main joint output is the 
protection of the local/regional environment. Aunan et al. (2003: 289-290) even point 
out that it is reasonable to believe that geographically limited co-effects of climate 
policy, like improving air quality in cities and securing energy supply, have had a 
positive influence on the level of China's climate protection efforts. The benefits 
derived from such co-effects of climate policy are also called ancillary or secondary 
benefits. In contrast, the benefits derived from the climate protecting impact of 
climate policy, which constitutes – of course – the primary aim of such a policy, are 
called primary benefits (see Markandya and Rübbelke (2004)). Several ancillary 
benefit assessment studies found out that ancillary benefits even represent a multiple 
of the benefits derived from climate change mitigation itself (see Pearce (2000)). 
Let us illustrate and exemplify the joint-production property of environmental policy 
by discussing the different effects of climate policy. In doing so we make a distinction 
between things (commodities or policies) and characteristics (properties or effects), as 
proposed by Lancaster (1966). Climate policies (things) generate different effects 
(possess different characteristics) and the relevant effects/characteristics should all be 
included in the analysis of these policies. It is these effects/characteristics which 
agents (people) are interested in and not the policies as such. However, not all 
characteristics are equally relevant for individual agents.  
                                                 
5 However, there are joint products of global environmental protection activities that are 
strongly appreciated by industrialized countries. So climate protection by using renewable 
energy sources also raises the security of energy supply, which is a topic highly ranked on the 
political agenda of industrialized as well as developing countries. For a recent analysis of 
European security of energy supply see Markandya et al. (2007).   7
Consequently, the relationship between ‘things’ and people are at least a two-stage 
affair (see Figure 1). “It is composed of the relationship between things and their 
characteristics (objective and technical) and the relationship between characteristics 
and people (personal, involving individual preferences)” (Lancaster (1971: 7)):  
CO2 is the most important gas contributing to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect and 
therefore climate policies (things) may target the reduction of CO2 emissions in order 
to protect the climate (characteristic). Climate protection, in turn, yields primary 
benefits for everyone (people). 
In general such climate policies (things) generate the co-effects (characteristic) in the 
shape of local/regional air pollution mitigation, since they regularly also reduce 
emissions of non-CO2 pollutants like NOX, SO2 and PM.
6 The improved air quality 
yields ancillary benefits for the climate protecting agents (people).   
Most of the ancillary benefits are local or regional, i.e. they are enjoyed exclusively by 
the communities located relatively close to the source of the policy (Pearce (1992: 5); 
IPCC (1996: 217) and Krupnick, Burtraw and Markandya (2000: 54)).
7 Therefore, we 
can largely regard ancillary effects to be private to the host country or region where 
the climate policy is introduced. Consequently, they contrast to the primary effect 
which exhibits global publicness, i.e. no country can be excluded from enjoying 
primary benefits generated in any other country and there prevails non-rivalry 
concerning the consumption of the primary effect (climate stabilization) of climate 
                                                 
6 Such pollutants are associated with negative health effects, accelerated surface corrosion, 
weathering of materials and impaired visibility. 
7 However, the abatement of the greenhouse gases CFCs generates an important global 
ancillary benefit by protecting the ozone layer (Rübbelke (2002: 23)).   8
policy.
8 Due to the different degrees of publicness of the different characteristics 
(global climate protection and local/regional air pollution mitigation) of climate 


















  Figure 1: Climate Policies – Impure Public Goods. 
 
3. A Model with Two Impure Public Goods  
3.1 Goods and Characteristics 
A country can consume a private goods bundle y. Furthermore, we consider two 
different technologies representing impure public goods. These goods q1 and q2 
generate the same kinds of characteristics, which are 1) the reduction of global 
                                                 
8 Yet, as Rypdal et al. (2005) stress, some GHGs not only generate global but also more 
regionally confined climate effects. 
 
climate policies     
climate protection   mitigation of local/regional      
air pollution  
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   things 
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  people 
stage 1 
stage 2   9
pollutants (GHG emissions) and 2) the mitigation of local/regional pollutants (like 
NOX, PM and SO2 emissions). The reduction of local emissions represents a private 
characteristic z from an individual country's point of view. The mitigation of global 
pollution is a global public characteristic x. 
The maximization problem of an individual country j that decides on the 
environmental technology application is:  




j 1 j j = ∑ ∑   (1) 
s.t. 
, q α q α z j 2 2 j 1 1 j + =   (2) 
, x ~ q β q β x j 2 2 j 1 1 + + =   (3) 
j 2 j 1 j j pq q y i + + = ,  (4) 

















 and  0 < xx U.   ij represents the 
exogenously given income of country j.  The index of countries (j) runs from 1 to N.  
x ~  stands for the amount of the global public good (mitigation of global pollution) 
produced by the other countries. The price of the first technology is normalized to 
unity. The price of the second technology is denoted by p, with 0 < p and the sum of 
all agents' production of q1 and q2 is represented by ∑q1j and ∑q2j, respectively. The 
parameters α and β measure how many units of characteristic z and x, respectively, are 
produced by one unit of a technology. Each unit of the private goods bundle, which 
can be acquired at a price of unity, produces one unit of a private characteristic, so that 
y denotes the amount of the private good as well as the amount of the private 
characteristic generated by this goods bundle. The characteristic of y is different from   10
the private characteristic generated by the environmental technologies. Table 1 
summarizes the relations between commodities (y, q1, q2) and their characteristics (y, 
z, x). 
Throughout, we will employ the Nash assumption that the utility maximizing agent 
(country) conjectures that the other agents' provision of the public characteristic does 
not change in response to modifications in its own public characteristic generation.  
  goods   y  q1  q2 
Characteristics 
produced by one 
unit 
       
y    1 0 0 
z    0  α1  α2 
x    0  β1  β2 
Table 1: Relations between Goods and Characteristics. 
The maximization can be presented in a graphical depiction. Since we face the goods-
sphere in the budget constraint while we have the characteristics-sphere in the utility 
function, we have the options to show the problem in the goods-space (g-space) or in 
the characteristics-space (c-space). After the graphical depiction in both spaces, we 
will analyse the maximization problem analytically in characteristics space. In Figure 
2, depicting the goods-sphere, the plane ABC represents the budget constraint.   11
 
Figure 2: Goods Space. 
The budget constraint is associated with the following four extreme points: 






























































The point where the highest of the set of indifference surfaces - which are not mapped 
- is tangent to the plane ABC, represent the optimal allocation of the three goods. 
The transformation between g-space and c-space is determined by the following 
relationships: 
 y = y,   (5) 
, 2 2 1 1 q q z α α + =   (6) 
x ~ q q x 2 2 1 1 + + = β β . (7) 
Let us assume that technology 1 has a comparative technological advantage over 











In Figure 3, we first have a look at the provision of the public characteristic by itself – 
i.e ignoring the contribution of other countries in producing the public characteristic.   
This implies that the considered agent is the only provider of impure public goods. 
Later on, we omit this simplifying assumption. 
The vectors 0Q1 and 0Q2 show the amounts of private (z) and public (x) characteristics 
that can be produced by different expenditures on technologies 1 and 2, respectively. 
Another vector coinciding with the axis measuring y shows the amount of the private 
characteristic (y) which can be acquired by particular expenditures on y. 
If the country would pay its total income on technology 1, it would generate z1 = α1i 
units of the private characteristic and x1 = β1i units of the public characteristic. This 
point is indicated by E in Figure 3. The points x1 and z1 are not shown in the figure.  
If the country would spend its income i completely on technology 2, it would produce  
p
i
z 2 2 α =  units of the private characteristic and 
p
i
x 2 2 β =  units of the public 
characteristic. This point is indicated by F. 
If the country would only consume the private good, it would get y = i units of the 
private characteristic. This point is indicated by point D. 























































































Figure 3: Characteristics Space. 
The budget constraint in characteristics space is represented by plane DEF. It has a 
slope that shows the rate at which one characteristic can be transformed into others by 











< , i.e. for each monetary unit spent on q1 the country receives less of the 
private and more of the public characteristic than it would get for one monetary unit 
spent on q2.  










> , we would be 
facing a trivial case, where the country exclusively consumes the impure public 
technology 2 (and no unit of technology 1), since a monetary unit spent on it produces 









O   14










>  would just be a counterpart of the case we will 
consider here.  
At the efficient point where the highest of the set of indifference curves is tangent to 







































β α β α
β α
  (8) 
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between both impure public goods 
2 1 q , q MRS  has to be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between private good and 
the second impure public good 





Next, let us consider the more general case where other agents also produce the public 
good. Then, the graphical depiction has to take account of the fact that there is some 
exogenously given amount of the public characteristic x ~  provided by the other agents 
(see Figure 4). 
   15
 
Figure 4: Integration of Other Agents’ Provision of the Public Characteristic. 
3.2 Impure Public Good Provision in a Two-Country World 
Efficiency in a world of more than one country would not be achieved if individual 
countries would act according to condition (8). In order to illustrate the inefficiency, 
let us have a look at a world consisting of two regions or countries, which represent 
the industrialized (indexed by I) and developing (indexed by D) world, respectively. 
We omit the private good in the subsequent analysis. Thus we focus on the analysis of 
the consumption of two impure public goods. This is similar to the approach suggested 
by Auld and Eden (1990), but they consider three different characteristics. For 
simplicity we temporarily assume technologies and prices to be equal among regions. 
Therefore, an individual country j’s (with j = D,I) maximization problem becomes 





q , q j 2 1j
= ∑ ∑   (9) 










, q α q α z j 2 2 j 1 1 j + =   (10) 
, x ~ q β q β x j 2 2 j 1 1 + + =   (11) 
. pq q i j 2 j 1 j + =   (12) 
In contrast, Pareto-efficiency would require that global welfare is maximized. In this 
case we have to maximize the sum ∑U of both countries’ utility. Then we obtain 








j ) x , z , z ( U ) q , q ( U     Max   (9’) 
s.t. 
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, q q z I 2 2 I 1 1 I α α + =   (10’’) 
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j 1 I D ∑ + ∑ = +   (12’) 
iD and iI stand for the developing country’s and the industrialized country’s monetary 
income level, respectively. q1D and q2D (q1I and q2I) are the developing (industrialized) 
country’s production of the impure public technology 1 and technology 2, 
respectively. The respective values for p, α1, α2, β1 and β2 are assumed to be equal 
among the individual countries.  
Global welfare maximization yields the result that Pareto-efficient public good 




















































.  (13)   17
The external effects the considered country exerts on the other country by means of 
the global public characteristic provision are taken into account in this condition. 
Comparison of equations (8) and (13) shows that the individual country ignores the 
externalities it exerts on the other country if it maximizes only its own welfare (see 
(8)) while global welfare maximization would require that countries take spillovers 
exerted on others into account. 







































































































  (14) 
i.e., the sum of the individual countries’ marginal rates of substitution between the 
impure public technologies, i.e. ∑
D 2 D 1 q , q MRS , in the developing country has not only 
to be equal to the price ratio but also to be equal to the sum of the marginal rates of 
substitution between the impure public technologies in the industrialized country, i.e. 
∑
I 2 I 1 q , q MRS . 
In order to correct the resulting inefficiency in public good provision, a transfer or 
subsidy on behalf of the first technology q1, which generates a higher amount of global 
externalities, would be suitable. (Take into account that we assumed:  2 1 p β β > .)   18
In order to introduce a subsidy, some kind of coordination between both countries 
must take place. Otherwise, the agents do not change their inefficient behaviour 
associated with condition (8). 
In order to analyse how transfers may improve the outcome, we propose a more 
general model in the subsequent section by which we can analyze a continuum of 
impure public goods and not only two alternative technologies.  
 
4. A Generalized Model 
In this section we consider a generalized version of the model presented in the 
previous section, in which the relative prices of the global and local public goods can 
vary and where there is a continuum of technologies for producing the two types of 
goods. The model assumes that each country produces a private good (Y), which has as 
by-products two ‘bads’ (X and Z).  Z is a local public bad, which only affects the 
country concerned (e.g. air pollution), while X is a global public bad (e.g. GHG 
emissions). 
The country places a penalty on both X and Z, which depend on its level of wealth or 
potential output (YP). We assume this cost or penalty associated with the bad Z is 
higher than that of X at low levels of wealth but at higher levels of wealth the penalty 
arising from X becomes higher. Each of the prices of the bads X and Z has an elasticity 
greater than one with respect to wealth – i.e. a one percent increase in wealth raises the 
penalty for both by more than one percent. The two functions PX and PZ are depicted 
in Figure 5.     19
The country has a capacity for Y which is determined by its capital – human, physical 
and natural, which we refer to as Yp. The country can sacrifice some of its potential 
output to have a lower level of X and Z. It decides this based on the objective function 
V, where: 
X P Z P Y V X z − − =  (15) 
 
Analysis of the case with a unit elasticity of substitution between X and Z 
Initially we consider the case where there is considerable substitutability between X 
and Z.  To fix ideas we take a simple iso-elastic function, which is analytically 
tractable, and which relates Y to YP, X and Z: 























XP and ZP are the uncontrolled levels of X and Z respectively, which are produced by 
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 (17) 
Equations (17) reflect the form of the functions as given in Figure 5. The aim is to 
show a lower penalty associated with Z at low levels of wealth and a higher penalty at 
higher levels of wealth. 
























Solving for X and Z in terms of Y, PX and PZ and substituting back into (16) we get: 
{ }
)) 1 /( 1 ( ) )( (
β α α β α β β αβ α
− − − − − − = Z X P P P P P Z X Y Y  (19) 




























As the prices of X and Z increase the country lowers its output relative to its potential 
output and reduces the corresponding levels of X and Z. 
Note that X and Z cannot exceed the values XP and ZP respectively. Hence from (18) 






























With the particular forms of the functions (17) we can show that Y as a percentage of 
YP declines with YP. Similarly X as a function of XP and Z as a function of ZP are non-
increasing functions of XP and ZP respectively. This implies that as countries get richer 
they make bigger proportional reductions in the pollutants X and Z (or at least non 
decreasing proportional reductions in X and Z). 
With  PX increasing with YP we would expect that richer countries can ‘bribe’ the 
poorer countries to reduce emissions of X and still leave themselves better off. We 
check this below. The extent to which there is potential for such transfers depends on 
how much price difference there is between the poor country’s valuation of X and the 
rich country’s valuation.   
If the rich country makes a transfer to a poor country in the form of a payment per unit 
of X reduced, this is equivalent to an increase in the penalty of X. From (20) we can 
see that such a price increase will lower Y and X. Furthermore, because it lowers Y it 
will also lower Z – i.e. the local public bad will decline although not necessarily as a 
percentage of its maximum value ZP.
9 
To see how the values of X and Z vary with wealth we have carried out some 
simulations. In particular we have taken the following parameter values (Table 2).  
                                                 
9 Note that there is a very important qualification to the above statements. This is to the effect 
that an increase in PX may not reduce X but merely leave it unchanged. Corner solutions turn 
out to be common. So the ‘offer’ has to be made to a country that is willing to make some 
reductions in X in the first place. As our example shows, this only happens when per capita 
income is above a certain threshold.   22
Table 2:  Parameters for Simulation of Results 
 
Parameter Value  Reason 
Α1  0.05  A one percent decline in Z results in a 0.05 percent decline 
in Y 
Β  0.05  A one percent decline in Z results in a 0.05 percent decline 
in X 
YP  $300 to 
$20000 
Normalized to per capita GDP.  We ignore the impacts of 
differences in population. 
ZP  Equal to YP  Measured in the same units as Y by normalization 
XP  = 1.8 times 
YP 
Assumed measured in kg. per dollar GDP.  1.8 kg carbon 
is generated per $ of GDP (WDI) for low income 
countries. So X is interpreted as a global public bad. 





Γ  1.1 
Chosen so that PX = 0 at per capita income of $300 and 
increases so that at income of $20000 it is $0.05 per kg 
(i.e. $50 per ton of carbon).  Yields an elasticity w.r.t. YP of 
around 1.2 at low incomes. 
 
Figure 6 shows how the price indices for X and Z move over time, with the price of X 
overtaking that of Z.    
The results for different potential income levels are shown in Table 3. We note the 
following: 
1.  Poor countries do not reduce either X or Z at all initially. Gradually, as incomes 
increase to around $4,800 they initially desire to reduce Z. Reductions in X follow 
only after income has reached around $12,000. Hence any transfers of cash would 
have to be to countries above this level of income to be effective. 
   23













Table 3: Solutions for Different Levels of Wealth: Unit Elasticity 
Solutions        
Yp  ($)  500  4700  5000 10000 15000 20000 
Y  ($)  500 4683 4944 9084  12966  16691 
Z  500 4367 3992 1463 1245 1168 
X  900  8460  9000 18000 17641 16542 
Z/Zp  100.0% 92.9% 79.8% 14.6%  8.3%  5.8% 
X/Xp  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  65.3%  46.0% 
PX  0.00082 0.01022 0.01094 0.02351 0.03675 0.05045 
PZ  0.01235 0.14524 0.15546 0.33325 0.52055 0.71433 
 
2.  The reduction in income relative to potential income is modest. Initially of course it is 
zero, but at about $5,000 potential income the reduction is about 1.1 percent. At 
$10,000 income the reduction or sacrifice is about 9 percent and at $20,000 it is about 
17 percent. Of course we can calibrate the model so that it reflects the reductions in Z 
more accurately. This would help make the model predictions under varying 
parameters more credible. 
3.  The rising price of X means that richer countries want to reduce X more than poor 
countries. Poor countries on the other hand have a lower benefit from making 
reductions and lower costs associated with the reductions. So a transfer from the richer   24
country to the poor country is possibly to everyone’s advantage.  For example, 
suppose a country at $20,000 were to ask a country at $500 to reduce emissions by 10 
percent. The cost to the poor country is the loss in Y less the value of the reduced 
emissions, which amount to $2.42 per person. The rich country, however, gains the 
benefit of the reduction in X at the marginal price of X, which amounts to $4.54. So 
there is a gain in making the transfer.   
 
Analysis of the case with no substitutability between X and Z 
The above analysis is based on a high degree of substitutability between the goods X 
and Z.  The form of the ‘Cobb Douglas’ type utility function implies an elasticity of 
substitution of one between the two goods.  As Cornes and Sandler (1994) noted in a 
different context this degree of substitutability is important in determining the optimal 
provision of impure public goods.  For this reason we also look at the implied optimal 
allocations in the case where the two goods X and Z are produced in fixed proportions 
(i.e. there is no substitutability between them). 
The production function can now be represented as 















While the level of Z is now a fixed proportion of X.  That is: 
X Z ξ =  
The maximand is the same as before – i.e. equation (15).  The maximization, however 
now yields the following expression for Y: 
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The results of the same analysis as presented for the unit elasticity case are given in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Solutions for Different Levels of Wealth: Zero Elasticity 
Solutions        
Yp  ($)  500  4700  5000 10000 15000 20000 
Y  ($)  500 4416 4681 8993  13177  17279 
Z  500 1349 1336 1197 1123 1073 
X  900 2429 2405 2155 2021 1931 
Z/Zp  100.0% 28.7% 26.7% 12.0%  7.5%  5.4% 
X/Xp  100.0% 28.7% 26.7% 12.0%  7.5%  5.4% 
PX  0.00082 0.01022 0.01094 0.02351 0.03675 0.05045 
PZ  0.01235 0.14524 0.15546 0.33325 0.52055 0.71433 
Phat  0.00768 0.09090 0.09731 0.20864 0.32595 0.44730 
 
The results compare starkly with the case of unit elasticity of substitution.  Now the 
threshold level of per capita income at which major reductions are made in the local 
public good decline almost continuously whereas before there was a threshold value at 
around $6,000 (see Figure 7b).  At the same time, the reductions at high income levels 
remain similar.  For example, with unit elasticity the level of the local public bad is 
reduced to 6% of its maximum value at an income of $20,000, whereas with a zero 
elasticity it is reduced to 5% of its maximum value. 
As far as the global public bad is concerned the difference is even more marked.  
Whereas with a unit elasticity the income level at which reductions in this bad were 
sought was around $10,000, with a zero elasticity of substitution a country seeks to 
make the reductions more of less continuously from a low income.  Moreover the final 
reduction sought at an income of around $20,000 is much higher with a zero elasticity.  
The scope for conditional transfers from rich to poor countries is now slightly smaller 
as the reduction in X that the rich country imposes a higher cost in terms of a reduction 
in Y, as there is no scope for adjusting the amount of Z that it generates.  Nevertheless   26
the example considered above for the unit elasticity also generates a net gain through 
conditional transfers in this case.  
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5. Conclusions   
 
This paper is a contribution to the literature on impure public goods. In particular we 
examine the role of international transfers in obtaining an efficient global allocation of 
resources in the presence of such public goods. To date the analysis of impure public 
goods has not examined the case of a continuum of technologies where an efficient 
solution requires conditional transfers – i.e. payments from one country to another to 
undertake a different supply of global and local public goods than the second country 
would wish to undertake. Andreoni (1986, 1989, 1990) examined the case of 
unconditional transfers in the presence of impure public goods. Bergstrom (1989) and 
Ihori (1996) looked at conditional transfers but only with pure public goods. Posnett 
and Sandler (1986) investigate impure public goods (charity) and stress the positive 
effect of fiscal transfers (e.g. tax exemption) on their provision prospects. Finally Auld 
and Eden (1990) analyzed corrective taxes-cum-subsidies in a two-commodity world, 
where each of the goods has three characteristics. 
Apart from filling this gap in the literature the motivation for our analysis is climate 
policy in the presence of local air pollution. In this context countries have different 
preferences for the ‘local’ (i.e. air pollution) versus the ‘global’ (i.e. climate change) 
public goods. Our analysis shows that individual country solution can be improved 
upon by making transfers from the richer countries to the poorer ones, if the latter have 
a lower relative preference for the global public goods than the former. The 
magnitudes of such transfers will depend on the relative benefits of the global and 
local pollutants in the two countries.   
We also need to see how the potential for transfers depends on the degree of 
complementarity between X and Z. With a ‘Cobb Douglas’ type of function used here   28
the elasticity of substitution between the two is of course one. With a zero degree of 
substitutability the adjustment to a lower level of the global public good in fact starts 
to happen at a lower per capita income level. The scope for conditional transfers is still 
there, although the gains can be slightly smaller than when adjustment on the ‘X-Z’ 
margin is possible. 
Further work is needed to examine the potential for conditional transfers more fully 
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